

Fraud Travels Too: Real-Time Threats in OTAs and LATAM





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Destinia

Onlinetravel
by DESTINIA

**TRAVEL
REPUBLIC**

**Tech
Tool
Solutions**

WOZOZO

TORTravel

egipto.com

Netflights



Today's Flight Plan

1. Same Industry, Different Realities in Fraud Prevention
2. LATAM as a Leading Indicator of Travel Fraud Trends
3. Two Real Attacks: What Actually Happened
4. Q&A

Same Same But Different



Limited Control over the Experience

Same Same But Different



Limited Control over the Experience



Different Economics of False Positives



Chargebacks Costs Asymmetry

Same Same But Different



Limited Control over the Experience



Different Economics of False Positives



Chargebacks Costs Asymmetry



Delayed Fraud Feedback Loop

Same Same But Different... STRONGER TOGETHER



Limited Control over the Experience



Different Economics of False Positives



Chargebacks Costs Asymmetry







Delayed Fraud Feedback Loop






Expanded Payment Attack Surface

Fraud Trends in Latam


Fraud Trends in Latam



Fraud Trends in Latam



3DS in LATAM: A Strategy That Must Be Orchestrated, Not Deployed




3DS in LATAM: Performance by type of bank




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Challenge Approval Rate




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Bank Authorization Rate




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Challenge Approval Rate




MX

Bank Authorization Rate



3DS in LATAM: Performance by bank



“An Unexpected Guest”

An Unexpected Guest

16 fraudulent attempts · Dec 2024 – Jun 2025

Wave 1 — Fraud Detected

Dec 20, 2024

4 attempts · 9:33–9:40 · 7 minutes

Time	Validation	Verdict
9:33	Triggered Investigation	REJECT
9:34	Triggered Investigation	REJECT
9:39	—	REJECT
9:40	—	REJECT

~ 6 months later

Wave 2 — Going Deeper

Jun 11, 2025

7 attempts · 9:03–10:37

Time	Validation	Verdict
9:03	Liveness	REJECT
9:07	—	REJECT
9:07	—	REJECT
9:09	Liveness	REJECT
9:11	Liveness	REJECT
10:16	Liveness	REJECT
10:37	—	REJECT

8 days later

Wave 3 — Still Trying

Jun 19, 2025

5 attempts · 8:28–9:38

Time	Validation	Verdict
8:28	—	REJECT
8:29	—	REJECT
8:30	—	REJECT
9:37	—	REJECT
9:38	—	REJECT

“An Unexpected Guest”

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA - MERCOSUR
REGISTRO NACIONAL DE LAS PERSONAS
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, OBRAS PUBLICAS Y VIVIENDA

Apellido / Surname
L [REDACTED] A

Nombre / Name
C [REDACTED] AN [REDACTED] EL

Sexo / Sex: M Nacionalidad / Nationality: ARGENTINA Ejemplar: C

Fecha de nacimiento / Date of birth
[REDACTED] / SE [REDACTED] 4

Fecha de emisi3n / Date of issue
[REDACTED] / TI SE [REDACTED] 19

Fecha de vencimiento / Date of expiry
[REDACTED] / TI SE [REDACTED] 34

Firma certificada / Signature
[REDACTED]

Documento / Document
2 [REDACTED] 3

Trámite N° / Cf. ident.
7636

[REDACTED]

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA - MERCOSUR
REGISTRO NACIONAL DE LAS PERSONAS
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Apellido / Surname
L [REDACTED] A

Nombre / Name
C [REDACTED] AN [REDACTED] EL

Sexo / Sex: M Nacionalidad / Nationality: ARGENTINA Ejemplar: C

Fecha de nacimiento / Date of birth
[REDACTED] / SE [REDACTED] 4

Fecha de emisi3n / Date of issue
[REDACTED] / TI SE [REDACTED] 19

Fecha de vencimiento / Date of expiry
[REDACTED] / TI [REDACTED] 034


Firma certificada / Signature
[REDACTED]

Documento / Document
2 [REDACTED] 3

Trámite N° / Cf. ident.
7636

[REDACTED]

“An Unexpected Guest”



- Name
- Nationality
- Date of Birth
- Surname
- Date of Expiry
- Document
- 2D Barcode
- Face Image

“An Unexpected Guest”

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA - MERCOSUR
REGISTRO NACIONAL DE LAS PERSONAS
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, OBRAS PUBLICAS Y VIVIENDA

Apellido / Surname
L [REDACTED] A

Nombre / Name
C [REDACTED] AN [REDACTED] EL

Sexo / Sex M Nacionalidad / Nationality ARGENTINA Ejemplar C

Fecha de nacimiento / Date of birth
1 [REDACTED] T / SE [REDACTED] 74

Fecha de emisión / Date of issue
2 [REDACTED] T / SE [REDACTED] 19

Fecha de vencimiento / Date of expiry
2 [REDACTED] T / SE [REDACTED] 34

Documento / Document
2 [REDACTED] 3

Trámite N° / Of. ident.
[REDACTED]
7636

FIRMA IDENTIFICADA / SIGNATURE
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

“An Unexpected Guest”



**“An Unexpected
Guest”**



“The Invisible Fraud”

The Invisible Fraud

A social engineering operation that passed every automated control



Booking type

**Hotel — refundable
long cancellation
window**



SCA result

**PASSED
No challenge triggered**



Customer data

**100% clean
No known fraud links**



Automated alerts

**ZERO
All controls passed**



Detection method

**Payment-level
human investigation**

Every standard control passed. Detection required a human team actively investigating at the payment level.

From fake agency to chargeback — a 9-step operation

1 Fake site built
travono.co.uk — registered 26 Feb 2026. Professional design, airline logos, ATOL badge. No real booking engine.

2 Victim finds site
Searching online for cruise / flight options. Site passes visual inspection.

3 Card details stolen
Victim calls to 'confirm reservation'. Provides full card details over the phone.

4 Cover story built
Fraudsters make a real — temporary — cruise reservation in victim's name. Complete with cabin number.

5 Real booking placed
Stolen card used to book hotel on Netflights. Passes SCA. No alerts.

6 Fake confirmation sent
Manually fabricated confirmation document sent to victim after pushback.

7 Second extraction attempt
Fraudsters demand £700 for 'taxes'. This overreach triggers victim's suspicion.

8 Victim investigates
Calls cruise company. Phantom reservation already cancelled. Contacts Destinia.

9 Fraud detected
Payment-level connection identified. Chargeback filed. Operation unravelled.

travono.co.uk — designed to deceive

● Domain registered: 26 Feb 2026 · Expiry: 26 Feb 2027 · CMS: WordPress · Address: 190 High Holborn, London (fictitious) · Phone: 020 3987 1929

✓ WHAT IT SHOWS

✓ Emirates, Virgin Atlantic, Turkish Airlines logos

✓ 'ATOL Protected' badge (fraudulent use)

✓ 'Established since 1999' (fabricated)

✓ 190 High Holborn, London (real address — false claim)

✓ 'Secure Payments' & '24/7 Customer Support'

✓ Stock photography of global destinations

✓ Airline partner logo strip

✗ WHAT IT LACKS

✗ No real booking engine — 'Book Now' → phone number

✗ No secure payment gateway — cards taken by phone

✗ No real confirmation system — manually fabricated

✗ No verifiable ATOL licence number

✗ No Companies House registration

✗ No automatic confirmation — delays to build pressure

Every call-to-action on the site leads to a phone call — where card data is extracted. The site is not a booking platform. It is a card harvesting tool.

This is not opportunistic fraud — it is a managed operation

01

The Phantom Reservation

Fraudsters created a real, temporary cruise reservation in the victim's name — complete with cabin number. Active for less than one hour. Cancelled before generating any cost.

Purpose: If the victim checked with the cruise company, they would find a real booking and be reassured. It bought time.

"The reservation had already been cancelled. It had been active for less than one hour."

02

The Victim Database

When the victim's wife called the fraudsters' number, they immediately identified her: 'Mrs R[REDACTED]' — without her introducing herself.

Implication: The operation maintains a database of victims cross-referenced against incoming calls. This is industrial-scale victim management.

"She was so shocked that she gave a false name and put the phone down."

03

Caller ID Screening

When called from a number that blocks caller ID: always engaged. When called from an identifiable number: they call back.

Implication: The operation actively screens calls to avoid investigation. A deliberate anti-detection countermeasure.

"If they are called via telephone that blocks the source number it is always engaged."

6 implications for every travel platform

1 SCA ≠ Fraud Prevention

The booking passed Strong Customer Authentication because the real cardholder provided their details voluntarily. SCA confirms access to the card — not that the person was not deceived.

2 European fraud has moved beyond the payment layer

No system was breached. No technical control was bypassed. The fraud was invisible at the transaction level — and required human investigation to surface.

3 Refundable bookings with long windows are a preferred vehicle

Deliberate choice: reduces detection urgency, gives the fraud more time to run. Worth tracking as a risk signal across platforms.

4 The OTA is the exit point — not the entry point

Netflights was where stolen data was converted into a real service. Understanding the full chain is essential to framing the shared nature of the threat.

5 Greed was the undoing

The operation was sophisticated enough to go undetected. The decision to demand a second payment — £700 for 'taxes' — was the overreach that triggered suspicion. The second contact is often the tell.

6 Victim management is becoming standard practice

A phantom reservation with a cabin number, a victim database, caller ID screening. This operation had a protocol. The sophistication gap between this and conventional fraud is significant — and growing.

The only way to stay ahead of an adversary that crosses borders freely is to share intelligence across the industry as freely as they do.

Fraud travels.

So should intelligence.

Q&A

